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THE NEW LOOK, THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE,
AND
THE LEBANON INTERVENTION, 1958.

BY

JAMES F. PONZO

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Advanced Research.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: James F. Ponzo

13 March 1991

Paper directed by
Bradford A. Lee,
Professor, Department of Strategy

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PREFACE

The study of the Eisenhower Administration continues apace. The ongoing declassification of the documents of these eight years in American history continues to provide additional insights into the decision making process of the President and those of his Administration. Because of this, many previous ideas about this period have been not only revised, but completely rethought.

In undertaking this research I entered two areas in which I had some knowledge but many conceptions which have proven to be misconceived. The first of these was the very nature of research and the incredible range and depth to which one must wander to achieve some sense of the topic. The second was the considerable bias in my understanding and knowledge of the period in which this country was under the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. This included a sense of a kindly golfer who mumbled a lot and rode a ship of state through the calm waters of the 1950's.

My initial desire was to research the use of U.S. military force in support of the Government of Lebanon in the late summer of 1958. What force was available? How was it employed? Was it sustainable had actual fighting occurred? What impact had the growth of strategic and tactical nuclear forces (or atomic as

they were known then) had on the conventional capability of the U.S.? It did not take long to answer most of these questions but as I now have come to know the number of questions research answers appears to be inversely proportional to the number it raises.

The result was a realization of the complexity of the decision which resulted in U.S. Marines wading ashore on a sandy beach across a road from the Beirut Airport. To fully present this issue I decided I must construct a paper which addressed the evolution of U.S. policy as directed by the Eisenhower Administration, the interests and objectives of the Administration's Middle East policy and the final result of this evolution: a U.S. presence on the ground in a Middle Eastern country.

There is significant scholarship and an increasing amount of primary source material available to aid in the investigation of the Eisenhower Administration. The number of White House papers, State and Defense Department memoranda, as well as the minutes and after action reports of the National Security Council increase with each Quarterly Report from the Declassified Documents Service.

Some of the other works which provided assistance in this effort included Reevaluating Eisenhower by Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, the papers of a conference hosted by Hofstra University in March 1984 and published under the title: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Soldier, President, Statesman, Douglas

Kinnard's President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, Fred Greenstein's The Hidden Hand Presidency, and Strategy Politics and Defense Budgets by Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond and Glenn Snyder.

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The New Look, the Eisenhower Doctrine
and
the Lebanon Intervention, 1958.

CHAPTER I

The New Look

A. THE REEVALUATION OF EISENHOWER.

In the past decade or so the close study of the decisions and leadership style of President Eisenhower has resulted in a reevaluation of his eight years as President. The dominant historical interpretation has evolved from that of the dull 50's and a dull Ike to an appreciation for the complexity of the issues, the depth and the strength of his presidential leadership, and the lessons which can be drawn from the organization and direction that the Eisenhower Presidency brought to the formulation and direction of American policy and strategy.

This paper is a contribution to that reevaluation. It reviews the administration on three levels. First, we will look at the evolution of the New Look and the impact this strategic concept direction had on the conventional military forces the

administration funded. We will examine, as others have, the administration's difficulties when faced with the global realities of U. S. commitments and the debate within the administration over the reliance on the "atomic option" versus the continuing necessity for capable, mobile conventional forces. By laying out figures for funding of the military establishment by service and fiscal year, we will show that others have exaggerated the impact on conventional forces of Eisenhower's cuts in the defense budget.

On the second level, we will look at U.S. policy in the Middle East and attempt to understand the objectives it embodies. An historical sketch of developments in the region will provide the background for this picture of American policy.

In the third level we will focus on the final political decision for intervention, the military planning for the mission and the actual movement of U.S. Armed Forces ashore in Lebanon in the summer of 1958. The outcome of the intervention and continuing regional interest for the United States indicates the success the Eisenhower Administration had in coming to terms with its policy.

B. ELECTION AND TRANSITION.

The presidential election of 1952 placed in office the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Enormously popular, he was easily elected in a

campaign in which he promised to end the war in Korea and take care of the "crooks and cronies" who inhabited Washington.¹

A determined effort by the leadership of the Republican Party persuaded the General to run for President. Eisenhower's sense of duty and his conviction of the importance of a leading U.S. role in world affairs as opposed to the isolationist attitude espoused by the Taft led wing of the Republican Party ultimately led to his acceptance of the nomination. The campaign had been a gruelling ordeal of whistle stops, radio talks and television appearances and it was no doubt with a sense of relief that, immediately following the election, the President-Elect and several of his key advisors left on a trip to Korea to fulfill a campaign promise to view the war zone.

The return trip aboard the U.S. Navy cruiser USS HELENA provided Eisenhower the opportunity to discuss his plans for not only ending the war in Korea but also his vision of the future and the direction he saw defense strategy and defense spending taking. The other participants of the Helena Conference included Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense-designate; Herbert Brownell, Attorney General-designate; John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State-designate; George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury-designate; and Joseph M. Dodge, Director of the

¹Joann P. Krieg, Editor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Soldier, President, Statesman (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 24.

Budget-designate.² The key questions this group addressed were how to deal with the threat of continued communist efforts at expansion and how to exercise the continued requirement for U. S. leadership of the free world. The President and his advisors were committed to a strong defense, but were equally committed to a strong economy and a balanced budget. Their dilemma was how to reconcile these two commitments.

C. STRATEGIC REASSESSMENT AND THE NEW LOOK CONCEPT.

With the new administration anxious to begin the work of re-directing the focus of U.S. strategy, the first issue that confronted them was the budget proposal which the Truman Administration had delivered to Congress only days before the Inauguration.³ It called for spending \$41.2 billion dollars on defense in 1954. The new administration considered the amount too high believing it would increase the Federal deficit and make an unacceptable inflationary impact on the economy. It quickly became apparent, however, that no amount of effort would achieve the reductions necessary to balance the budget in 1954; so in March the NSC decision was for an "approach to balancing" with achievement in 1955.⁴

²Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p.391.

³Ibid., p. 392.

⁴Ibid., p. 394.

One reason for a deliberate approach was that the Joint Chiefs reported to the NSC that the reductions were not achievable without serious problems arising in providing for the nation's defense in the coming high threat years.⁵ Undaunted, the civilian leadership moved to find the excess in the defense spending plans and decided that the proper course would include providing a ceiling or target for spending by the DOD, which then could determine the necessary allocations to each of the services.

The decision to rein in defense spending was not just an effort at budget balancing but also a direct attempt at obtaining an economy of force in coming to terms with the global threats and responsibilities which faced the United States. The Eisenhower Administration was, initially, of a mind that it could deal with both the threat of communist expansion and other crises through a combination of a powerful strategic nuclear force and "alliances, covert action and negotiations."⁶ The final result of the first budget effort, though not meeting the goal the administration had set for itself of a balanced budget, did cut the Defense funding request from the \$41.2 billion originally requested by the Truman Administration to \$36 billion, a figure which was later reduced further to \$35.8 billion.⁷

⁵Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), p. 24.

⁶John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 148.

⁷Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, p. 396.

With the first budget issue laid to rest the administration could now focus on its review of long range U. S. strategy. The style and methodology of the Eisenhower Administration's decision making was established immediately in its effort to recast the strategy. The complete manager and organizer, the President reorganized the National Security Council, expanding its membership and the frequency of its meetings as well as creating a pre-screening board which would set the agenda and insure that all concerned departments had input before major issues were discussed in a full NSC meeting. The President not only attended more NSC meetings than cabinet meetings but consistently invested more time and effort in preparing for the weekly NSC sessions.⁸

With the investiture of the new Joint Chiefs, which included Admiral Carney as CNO, General Ridgway as Army Chief, General Twining as Air Force Chief and Admiral Radford as the new Chairman, the President ordered that their first task be a critical look at all U.S. forces and their missions.⁹ Their effort, while defining a new strategy in terms which reflected the Presidents thinking, failed to provide the expected savings in defense spending that the civilian leadership had assumed would result. The work of the Chiefs was defended by the Chairman, Admiral Radford, who argued that no satisfactory

⁸Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency, (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 125.

⁹Kinnard, p. 23.

savings were possible until the Administration provided guidance on the "employment of nuclear weapons." ¹⁰ The result of this request was the issuance of NSC-162/2 in October 1953, which stated that in the event of hostilities with either the Chinese or the Russians "the United States will consider nuclear weapons as available for use as other munitions."¹¹ This guidance, combined with earlier direction which ordered planning for the "long haul" as opposed to the Truman Administration's planning for a specific "year of maximum peril," and the results of the JCS study would lay the foundation of the so-called New Look strategy.¹² If the threat of war was no greater in one year or another and if it nevertheless could be met with nuclear weapons then perhaps it would be possible to hold down conventional force spending to permit a balanced budget. The strategy established, the Administration could now concentrate on finding the proper balance of force for the next three years and reach their goal of a balanced budget with reduced defense spending. They had provided for a creditable posture to contain the communist threat and could deter aggression at times and places, and with weapons, of their choosing. This deterrence eventually would be labeled as "massive retaliation," and the success such posturing had achieved in forcing the Chinese and the North Koreans to the bargaining table and obtaining the Korean

¹⁰Ibid., p. 24.

¹¹Gaddis, p.149.

¹²Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, p. 400. and Kreig, p. 146.

Armistice seemed to validate the effectiveness and response such a policy could be expected to provide.

D. BUDGETARY DECISIONS AND DEBATES.

The 1955 defense budget, the first budget that the Eisenhower Administration put together from scratch, was not the easily managed effort that the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Budget Director and others had expected. Earlier reductions had targeted such areas as total manpower requirements, the number of Air Force Wings, the size of Naval fleets and the makeup of the Fleet Marine Force, and while the expected savings from the drawdown of the Korean forces were significant, further efforts at a continued reduction of conventional forces (the expected result of a greater reliance on atomic forces) were increasingly difficult to achieve.

The effects of inter-service rivalry, somewhat restrained by Eisenhower's JCS selections, made themselves felt both in the political maneuverings of Congress and an argument within the Administration started by Army Chief of Staff Ridgway. The first to argue the importance of creditable conventional capability, General Ridgway was concerned with declining Army forces with no concurrent decline in commitments and felt that no amount of air power could fully replace the many conventional options a ground force provided. The disagreements over the budget efforts between the service chiefs and the chairman were caused not only by a problem in communication but also in a mismatch in the

focus that the military and the civilian leadership had on the objective.¹³

Charles Wilson was not a strategic thinker, and Eisenhower did not intend him to be one. A former President of General Motors, his job was to simply direct the budgeting and management of the Defense Department.¹⁴ The Service Chiefs refused, however, to merely supply the proper numbers to Wilson to provide a balanced request; they surrounded their requests and consents to compromises with references to unchanging situations and static scenarios. In Congressional budget hearings they often provided inklings of their dissatisfaction with the ceiling approach to budgeting that the Administration was attempting to enforce. The result was often an increase in funding over the administration's request or a readjustment of the request to preserve the strength of the Marine Corps or provide additional Air Force Wings.

Throughout 1954 the Administration continued the push of its New Look; but this New Look was not the radical departure from previous strategy as it is often portrayed. The fundamental objectives of U.S. policy remained the containment of communism and the continued economic growth of Europe. The new strategy would maintain a credible military force to protect U.S. interests while investing in new nuclear forces. The conventional

¹³Ibid., p. 486.

¹⁴E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), p. 19.

force continued to be modernized and updated. To meet the requirement of providing the option for the selection of nuclear weapons in a conflict they evolved into dual purpose forces: they retained their conventional capabilities and added nuclear options.

The most noteworthy of the Administration's efforts to present its new appraisal of the long term objectives and the forces they would be utilizing came in Secretary Dulles' speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1954. It provided "one of the great moments in the rhetoric of the cold war."¹⁵ The speech, a mixture of ambiguities and catchy phrases to describe the potential responses of the U.S. to aggression, had little concrete substance for dealing with smaller crises or localized aggression. This lack of substance and the continued championing by Ridgway and others for additional conventional forces to deal with small contingencies set the stage for continued debate in and out of the Administration.

E. THE FUNDING OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

The result of the New Look and the budget balancing of the Administration was an initial decrease in military spending and a reduction of manpower but as can be seen in the summaries of the different military services this decrease did not prevent a gradual increase in most areas of defense spending over the course of the Administration's tenure. The graphs provided as an

¹⁵Kinnard, p. 26.

Appendix are a series of snapshots of each of the services and highlight some interesting trends in defense spending by the Administration.

The Air Force, while displaying some fluctuations, maintained a fairly steady manpower base. Their budget, while static in 1954 and 1955, increased considerably in the next three years. The total number of Air Force installations did not decline and with the increased emphasis on continental air defense the Air Force garnered sufficient funds to upgrade its facilities and continue to procure aircraft at an acceptable rate. This included the first of its long range B-52's for SAC, new air interceptors for TAC and the large C-130 cargo planes to provide airlift for MAC. The total number of Air Force Wings was reduced from 143 to 120 but by 1957 grew to 137 before again being reduced. This reduction is also deceptive because new fighters, bombers and transports provided increased firepower, range and payload with greater efficiency and with fewer total airframes. The Air Force also realized the value of dual capable systems such as continental air defense aircraft providing battlefield air cover and strategic bombers conventional ordnance delivery.

The Department of the Army summaries show a marked decrease in total manpower, a hardly surprising occurrence with the cessation of hostilities in Korea. A corresponding decrease in total fiscal authority is seen in the budget summary. Total Army Divisions, both deployed (Japan, Hawaii and Alaska) and

stateside also declined. The Army was able to reorganize into the new pentomic division concept and was heavily committed to research programs in various missile programs and battlefield weapons improvements. Additionally, they were able to stand up a new airborne division, procure additional helicopters and continue demanding and getting improvement of their Air Force supplied airlift. The reorganization into the pentomic divisions, by both deployed and stateside units, enabled the Army to participate in the New Look while maintaining and even upgrading its conventional force, as its leadership early on understood the opportunities and versatility multi-mission forces provided.

For the Navy, the move towards increased reliance on the "atomic forces" was a camouflaged blessing. Not until Admiral Burke became CNO in 1957, did the Navy openly join with the Army in the effort to protect and improve conventional force capability. Personnel strength declined initially but leveled off for the long term. Navy budget authority, although uneven, shows a gradual increase over the four year period. Total numbers of active ships also declined, but with the removal of ships from the World War Two assets which had been reactivated for the Korean conflict the decline is understandable. The Navy was able to obtain funding to continue building its Forrestal Class super carriers and it also obtained funding authorization for the first nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The carriers were initially the Navy's main weapon in the New Look for atomic munitions delivery. However, when the first units of the new

nuclear submarine fleet began to put to sea the Navy realized the conventional power projection mission for its carriers was just as important and the Administration quickly came to depend on them for initial crisis response. The total number of naval facilities to support the worldwide activities of the fleets also crept upwards during these years.

As has been discussed, the foundation of the strategy which came to be called the "New Look" had been laid throughout 1953. First, with Eisenhower's elucidation of the concept of the "long haul," then with the involvement of the Joint Chiefs in a long range planning effort for force structure, and finally with the decisions made concerning the use of atomic weapons in NSC 162/2. The strategy rested on the vision that the President and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had of the world in which the U.S. must provide leadership. They believed that stability and economic prosperity would provide the foundation for success in the struggle against communism. Though some historians have stressed Eisenhower's Eurocentric orientation, Eisenhower and Dulles were focused on U. S. interests and objectives in the Middle East.¹⁶ Here they saw the void left by the withdrawing British and French, frustrated nationalism, anti-colonialist sentiments directed against the West and an increasing potential for Russian influence. The continuing unrest and the complexity of the issues which the administration

¹⁶Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, Editors, Reevaluating Eisenhower, American Foreign Policy in the 1950's, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 193.

had to deal with in the next few years would result in a deliberate effort to provide a discriminating policy for this troubling area.

The New Look, The Eisenhower Doctrine
and
The Lebanon Intervention, 1958.

Chapter II


The Eisenhower Doctrine

A. THE MIDDLE EAST.

The history of the Middle East is replete with more than its share of war, conquest and shifting loyalties. For the purposes of this work, however, I will only cover the more recent history to enable the reader to have some sense of the numerous problems the Eisenhower Administration had to deal with in its foreign policy for this region.

The boundaries of the region in the early 1950's were essentially the results of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I. Britain, France and the United States came to an agreement on the shape of the post war Middle East. The first step in setting these boundaries was proposed in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Treaty [MAP 1]. Those who supported the nationalist desires of the Arab tribes, including such luminaries as T. E. Lawrence and Lowell Thomas, pressed the victorious allies to allow self-determination to occur in the former Ottoman provinces. Instead, after much maneuvering and

Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916



SOURCE: Desmond Stewart, T. E. Lawrence, p.215.

politicking, including a blind eye from the U.S., the British and French diligently drew countries on maps and made monarchs from nomads. The result was a hodgepodge of countries aligned with the British or the French with no sense of history or even the inclusion of entire tribes or families within one border.

In repayment for their war efforts, certain Arab families were given titles and positions and aligned with their colonial benefactor. These included the Saudis in that portion of the Arabian Peninsula now called Saudi Arabia, the Hashemites in both the Trans-Jordan and in those Turkish provinces now called Iraq. It is of interest to note that the original rulers who replaced the defeated Turks in the Syrian Provinces were the Hashemites but the French were suspicious of their possible allegiance to the British and would not allow them to remain in power; the compromise reached with the British was their transfer to Iraq.

That any of these governments had survived through a Second World War is remarkable (even more so is that two still exist today) but the anti-colonialism of the post World War II era brought major changes, including the rise of military factions which deposed the colonial based monarchies in Egypt and Syria. The precarious Christian-Moslem constitutional-confessional government in Lebanon maintained ties with the French, the British looked after the Jordanian Monarchy and Iraq, and the U. S. developed ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

The establishment of the State of Israel added to the turbulent politics of the region. In fact the efforts by U. S. to reach a balance by dealing with the countries of the Middle East as evenly as possible were inhibited by the Arab-Israeli conflicts as well as by the growth of socialism, nationalism and the Pan Arabism in all of the countries of the Middle East.

The 1950's saw continuing instability in Syria, the rise of Nasser and his Pan Arabism, anarchy and instability in Iran, weak leadership in Saudi Arabia, and the efforts of the Iraqi government to protect itself by aligning with the West in the Baghdad Pact. Other significant developments of this period included the Suez conflict, Soviet-Egyptian arms deals, and Soviet-Syrian arms deals.¹ The Lebanese, with their parliamentary government and pro-western political affiliation, had the seemingly impossible task of maintaining this allegiance while dealing with growing internal and external pressure to become more aligned with the Arab positions on Pan-Arabism and the elimination of any remnant of colonial influence.

B. LEBANON.

Lebanon had achieved independence in 1943. The coastal provinces of Syria initially were a balance of Christian and Moslem tribes, who established themselves as a sovereign state under a "National Covenant." The design of the unwritten

¹George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, Foreign Affairs Study 2, 1972), p. 102.

agreement was to provide Christian and Moslem leadership in a representational government which gave all the religious factions some percentage of participation. The country was very Western in its society, business, and politics. The results of its ties with the West included universities, hospitals, banks, a free and vocal press and a prosperous economy. The call of Pan Arabism, while appealing to the Arabs themselves as a weapon against the Christian leadership, was most likely, not a true aspiration of many of the Lebanese. The success of Pan Arabism might be the reincorporation of Lebanon with Syria: an unappealing result of Arab unity.

The Lebanese had to tread very carefully between the West and the Arab states. Sometimes this meant siding with the former colonial powers on one issue and with the Arab States on another. The conflicts of the mid-fifties made for some extremely difficult choices and the result was to strain the very fiber of the Lebanese structure. The constant shifting of political power in their closest and most influential neighbor, Syria, did little to aid the Lebanese in maintaining their middle-of-the-road position.

C. SYRIA.

There were over 22 different governments in Syria between 1949 and 1955, many of which were military dictatorships.² Any issue of Syrian politics became a Lebanese political issue

²Ibid., p. 101.

because two of the main political factions were the Islamic Brotherhood and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, both of which had extensive ties to Lebanon. With the rise of Pan Arabism and with the alliance of the Baathist party with the Soviet-aided Communist party to rule Syria in 1955 many Syrians fled to Lebanon where they added their voices to the increasing factionalism among its Arab population. By 1956 the Syrian government had begun to enter into a series of arms treaties with the Soviets and their Eastern European allies. A man reputed to be a Communist became Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army.

All of this worried the Eisenhower Administration.³ Indeed, the success of Nasser's Pan Arabism and the obvious involvement of the communists supported by Moscow led the President to conclude that Syria's move "toward the Communist orbit ...was apparently inexorable."⁴ The harsh rhetoric between Syria and Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, plus the apparent weakness of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon against the growing tide of Arab nationalism added to the administrations concern.

D. EGYPT

For Egypt one of the most humiliating symbols of its former status as a British protectorate was the continued British

³George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 59.

⁴Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 162.

control of the Suez Canal. Nasser determined that the time had come for Egypt to regain sovereignty over its own territory and to obtain the income that the canal provided. This was achieved with the easy step of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and taking control. The British and French were just as determined that such action could not be ignored for financial as well as strategic reasons, not only did the respective governments privately "own" the company but more importantly all their oil from the Persian Gulf transitted through the canal. The Israelis, of course, were looking for territorial buffers and the Sinai peninsula would be a superb one. So with no word to Washington the three moved militarily on the canal and precipitated the greatest threat to Western unity and the NATO alliance before or since.

President Eisenhower's response was swift and unwavering: all three parties must withdraw and allow Egypt the opportunity to control its own territory. The Egyptians had maintained that they would continue the operation of the canal and allow the right of free passage to all vessels (except Israeli). The Eisenhower Administration was concerned with not only the legality of the Egyptian claim but also saw benefit in the Arab world for its anti-colonial stance. American pressure was successful and following a cease fire the British and French withdrew their forces. It took some additional diplomatic wrangling however, to move the Israelis. The vast good will that the U. S. had accumulated in its opposition to the occupation

was dissipated in the support of Israeli demands for the right of free passage it expected for its vessels in the northern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.

The success of Nasser emboldened all the Pan Arabists and the defeat of the former colonial powers did little for the few remaining political leaders in the region still aligned with the West. The strength of the message which President Nasser preached increased his stature and his following among the Arab masses. The monarchies of the Middle East could not shed their ties to their western benefactors and Nasser's attacks against them via Cairo Radio increased their sense of apprehension.

E. THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE.

The Administration now realized that the departure of the former colonial powers was creating a power vacuum in the Middle East and the potential for further advances by the Soviets or the Pan Arabism of Nasser. Eisenhower clearly mistrusted Nasser; whether this was from his own judgment of Nasser's actions or the continuing bad blood between Dulles and Nasser following the U. S. decision not to fund the High Dam project is unclear. The President stated in Waging Peace, that he found "Nasser's exact political leanings ...something of a mystery." Eisenhower, evidently, was of the mind that the Arab unity that Nasser sought, and was so ably preaching to the Arab masses, was, in fact, the cover for a Communist effort to displace the West from the region. This attitude persisted in spite of the Administra-

tion's knowledge of the outlawing of the Communist Party in Egypt and the jailing of many of its leaders.⁵

By the late fall of 1956 the administration was working on a plan to increase the U. S. presence and support for its friends in the region. This effort was to include the use of economic and military aid to friendly Arab governments and a proclamation of U. S. intent to protect them against overthrow, by military force if necessary.

On January 5th, 1957, the President asked for specific Congressional authority to compensate for the loss of British and French influence. This authority was to include "authorization to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations (a reference to the Baghdad Pact), requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."⁶ Additionally, \$200 million dollars in aid was requested to be used in the Middle East at the president's discretion. The Congress debated the administration's request for over two months, but in March approval was granted and "The Eisenhower Doctrine" was proclaimed. No such proclamation would be worth the paper it was written on, however, if none of the countries it was designed to protect would not publicly acknowledge their approval. The Adminis-

⁵Ibid., p. 262.

⁶"The Middle East Resolution , approved March 9, 1957," U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1957, p.217. as cited in Melanson and Mayers, editors, Reevaluating Eisenhower, p. 192.

tration mounted a vigorous diplomatic campaign for such approval and successfully lobbied and obtained twelve endorsements; the only Arab state to endorse the doctrine was Lebanon.

President Chamoun of Lebanon wanted to obtain further U.S. support for his government. In April 1957, in a letter to President Eisenhower about one of the Jordanian crises, Chamoun stressed the importance of U. S.-Lebanese ties and the responsibility that the West had in preventing a communist takeover in Jordan. President Chamoun was well aware of Washington's thinking on the connection between communism and "its puppets or its allies."⁷ He went on to state his belief that: "the fate of western civilization is in the balance in this area. The Communists, who have infiltrated some of these lands beyond our imagination even one year ago, are at the bottom of most of the difficulties from which you and we suffer at the present in the Near East."⁸ (Underline added). He knew how to get Eisenhower's attention and reinforced suspicions of Nasser and his motives.

F. THE NEW LOOK RELOOKED.

The problems of the Middle East as well as the massive display of Soviet force in crushing the Hungarian uprising in

⁷"Special message from President Chamoun to President Eisenhower," Department of State, No: 2540, April 24, 1957, Declassified Documents Reference Service(Hereafter DDRS), 262, 1988.

⁸Ibid., p. 2.

1956, clearly demonstrated to the administration its inability to rely solely on the power of its nuclear arsenal to obtain its political objectives in time of crisis.

Indeed, it had been the use of emergency oil supplies for Great Britain which had forced the issue of their withdrawal from the Suez and the U. S. had been powerless to stop the movement of Russian tanks into Budapest. The arguments of General Ridgeway, General Taylor and others seem to have been validated and the administration began to look at its conventional force capabilities in a different light.

A decision was made to investigate the capability of U. S. forces to deal with small wars, to prevent their escalation and to investigate the contribution tactical nuclear weapons might make. The results of the investigation, conducted by the Gaither Panel, were presented to the President at the 352nd meeting of the National Security Council on the 22nd of January, 1958.

There were two major topics scheduled for the Council at this meeting: the report from the Gaither Panel and a review of the latest version of U. S. Policy for the Middle East.

Titled "Capabilities of Forces For Limited Military Operations" the report of the Gaither Panel provided the outline for the initial discussions at the meeting. This was a multi-numbered NSC agenda item, and the final recommendation of the Panel would call for an additional study, especially of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, at the "national level rather than at a service level." The record of the discussion in the

Council meeting included these remarks by Secretary Dulles about the necessity of conventional force in support of "our foreign policy over the last five years the State Department had sometimes felt a need for the United States to have non-nuclear-equipped forces which could put on a demonstration of U.S. interest in various parts of the world." Secretary Dulles then added that: "the Joint Chiefs of Staff had responded well when called upon to mount such demonstrations in the past ... aircraft carriers, airpower, and even potential landing forces had been very useful ... limited forces can be of assistance to U. S. foreign policy."⁹

The council decided to study further the problem of "augmenting the force or the capability of the force" and the JCS and the State Department were directed to work together to ensure this study would include the "problem of limited war in its political and foreign policy aspects."¹⁰ Quite obviously the earlier arguments that the service chiefs had made on the dual (that is conventional and nuclear) ability of the armed forces had been heard and the administration was not blindly following the massive retaliation agenda it is often suspected of depending upon to handle each crisis it faced. Providing the force to support its fundamental objectives of containment by assisting other states to resist the threat of communist

⁹National Security Council, "Minutes of the 352nd Meeting," The White House, January 22, 1958, DDRS, 329, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

expansion, the Eisenhower Administration relied on both the nuclear and conventional capabilities that its long range force planning had provided for.

G. LONG RANGE U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST.

The second agenda item of the NSC meeting was a far ranging discussion of the Middle East and the list of NSC Agenda items which were referenced to this topic included more than 12 separate meetings and memoranda. The discussion which ensued was extensive: it covered the root causes of regional instability, it expanded on the Eisenhower Doctrine, addressed the problems the Administration faced in the region and even covered the destabilization that continuing immigration to Israel would cause.

The first item discussed was the wording of a paragraph in the final document in which the "early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute" is the primary objective. The State Department version was accepted because it was more "flexible" said the President, (the DOD version used the words "take action to end" whereas the State version read "constantly explore the prospects to end").

In reviewing the use of conventional forces and in particular the movement of forces to support the Eisenhower Doctrine, as in the deployment of aircraft carriers to respond to the Jordanian crisis, Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles voiced the concern of the Department that " military authorities cannot

guarantee to hold military actions in the Near East to small limited operations once war began."¹¹ The gravity with which the Administration viewed the problems and its willingness to commit forces to respond when necessary, in spite of the possible risks of greater conflict, are indicative of its increased reliance on, and appreciation for, conventional forces.

The remarks of Secretary Dulles also add to our understanding and knowledge of administration attitudes on the Middle East. He stated that "no situation in the world has this Administration given more thought to" and "there is no greater danger to U. S. security" than the problems of the region. Finally he noted that "perhaps, indeed, the USSR will ultimately get control of the Near East; but in any event there has been no tendency to minimize the danger."

A discussion on the issues raised by the potential of Arab unity then followed. While there was not a consensus on the outcome of such a happening, Dulles pointed out that: "we do not (want to) end up uniting the Arab states against the United States and the West."¹² A result of Arab unification but also the result of a miscalculation by the U.S. in responding to developments in the region might well be alienation of the Arabs, but the failure to act when U. S. interests were at risk was unacceptable. The administration would continue its efforts

¹¹Ibid., p. 6.

¹²Ibid., p. 8.

at peaceful solutions but retain its options for military action when it deemed them necessary.

H. THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

On February the 1st, 1958, President Nasser of Egypt and President al Kuwatly of Syria signed a series of documents which merged the two states and formed the United Arab Republic. The close alignment of these two states symbolized the potential for the Pan Arab movement to achieve the long sought goal of Arab unity. But the union was not one of equals and the subjugation of the Syrians to Nasser's directives was viewed with much concern in Washington. This was in spite of the belief of the CIA that the Syrian Army had pushed for the merger to stop the influence of the Communist Party in Syria¹³. In fact Nasser outlawed the Party and dissolved all Syrian political parties. All major government appointments were made in Cairo and although the Syrians were to control the "northern region" even the Syrian Army was placed under the control of Cairo.

The other states in the region reacted with alarm at the news of the merger. Jordan and Iraq sought joint protection from the threat by forming the Arab Union, a move that brought increased attacks against both Kingdoms in numerous speeches from Nasser. King Saud of Saudi Arabia, a leader in whom Eisenhower had placed great hope, blundered in an attempt to assas-

¹³George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, (Washington: American Institute, 1971), p. 187.

sinate Nasser and was forced to transfer control of Saudi Arabia to his brother who was a strong supporter of Nasser and his Arab unity message.¹⁴

The situation in the Middle East continued to deteriorate in spite of every Administration effort to stabilize it. Their efforts to support friendly Arab governments inevitably clashed with the nationalist sentiments of the Pan Arabists who saw any western involvement or interest as continued colonialism, a position easily understood and continuously exploited by the communists.

¹⁴Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 264.

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Chapter III

The Lebanon Intervention.

A. MOUNTING CRISIS.

The spring of 1958 was one of continuing unrest and mounting pressure against the moderate governments of the Middle East. The verbal attacks against them, orchestrated out of Cairo, were unrelenting and designed to inflame the native Arab populations to advance the cause of Arab unity.

The monarchies of Iraq and Jordan attempted to negate the impact of the Syrian-Egyptian accord by creating their own Arab Union, but without the charisma and appeal of a Nasser to lead it, the effort only highlighted the differences and increased the invective against them from Cairo and Damascus.

In Lebanon, the dissatisfaction of the Arab population with the western tilt of the government increased and was influenced by several factors. The first was the results of elections in May and June 1957. President Chamoun manipulated the results to increase his Christian majority as part of a plan to amend the

constitution in order to remain in office for a second term. Moderate and Pan Arabist leaders deprived of their legitimate forums, turned to the streets to protest. Second, the influx of Palestine refugees had changed the balance of the population in favor of the Arabs, who were less represented than ever before in the government. And third there was the infiltration of Lebanon from Syria by Pan Arabists, who provided training, funding and weapons to the growing anti-government factions.¹ Arab resentment finally erupted into violent demonstrations when Chamoun's scheming to amend the constitution came to light in April 1958.²

The Eisenhower Administration followed the events in Lebanon with concern. The President also watched Nasser's responses and decided that "If he was not a Communist, he certainly succeeded in making us very suspicious of him." More importantly he was concerned that "Lebanon occupied a place on Colonel Nasser's timetable as a nation to be brought under his influence."³

On May 8th a pro-Nasser newspaper editor was assassinated and the crisis turned into open conflict. Armed bands of Christians and Arabs clashed in the major cities, Arab rebels took control of rural areas along the Syrian border and the Govern-

¹George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 368.

²Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol II: The President, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 464.

³Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 265.

ment lost control of the Arab districts in the capital city of Beirut. President Chamoun pleaded for American intercession under the auspices of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He justified his request on the grounds of Syrian aggression.⁴

B. WORDS AND ACTIONS.

President Chamoun's appeal came at a time of disquieting events throughout the world. The Vice-President had been set upon by communist inspired mobs in Venezuela, and U. S. troops were enroute to Cuba and Puerto Rico to assist the Venezuelan Government in protecting him. Communist insurgencies were creating unrest in Burma and Indonesia. Indeed, the Secretary of State saw "Communists ..stirring up trouble in area after area."⁵ In his memoirs the President later talked of "one more Communist provocation." Clearly the time had arrived for the Administration to signal American support for its friends under the policy of containment.

On May 13th the President and his key advisors had a far ranging discussion that weighed the impact of intervention and the impact of a failure to respond. The sticking points were the issues of legitimacy and justification. Eisenhower believed in the necessity of action but he just as strongly understood the

⁴Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 49.

⁵Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 464.

requirement to have a solid legal basis and broad political support for U. S. action.⁶

Arthur Larson in his biography, Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew, discusses Eisenhower's understanding of the power of "a strong legal position." It would provide the fundamental moral foundation for American action with the proper amount of military power, conservatively and selectively applied.⁷ The discussion that day clearly demonstrates the accuracy of Larson's assessment. The President and the Secretary of State realized that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not usable without declaring the UAR as the attacker and invoking the influence of communism --5 an unprovable assertion. Yet maintaining stability in the region was a vital U. S. interest as was providing support to help friendly governments maintain their independence. Congress would support a deployment of troops under presidential authority to protect American lives.

The other key concerns were regional support and possible crisis such action might trigger. The impact on other friendly governments in the Middle East could include their own destabilization. The closing of the Suez Canal and the cutoff of Europe's oil supplies were other possible repercussions. While the U. S. might well receive strong support in private from Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel it was extremely

⁶White House, "Memorandum of Conversation," May 13, 1958, DD RS, 525, 1988.

⁷Arthur Larson, Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew, (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1968), pp.85-105.

unlikely that public support would be forthcoming from these countries. The response from Arab countries on both sides of the spectrum would impact world opinion and the reaction of the Soviets was a key ingredient in determining a balanced and practical reply. The lack of action by the Lebanese Army was a concern: it reflected a lack of consensus within the Government of Lebanon for Chamoun's political maneuverings.

The initial Administration response included the redeployment of the Sixth Fleet, and their accompanying Marine Force, towards the waters off Lebanon while the search for legitimacy continued. There was no overt communist invasion force attacking but the threat to a friend was clearly evident.

The Administration answer to President Chamoun discussed these factors and laid out for him the final criteria that would be used by the Administration in providing American forces to support the Government of Lebanon. In Eisenhower's later words these were: "First, we would not send United states troops to Lebanon for the purpose of achieving an additional term for the President. Second, the request should have the concurrence of some other Arab state. Third, the mission of the United States troops would be twofold: protection of the life and property of Americans, and assistance to the legal Lebanese government."⁸

Further U. S. action proved unnecessary because the Lebanese Army finally stepped in and began to restore order. The violence however, did not completely end. President Chamoun now

⁸Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 267.

requested the United Nations investigate Lebanese border violations by Syrian and Egyptian insurrectionists. The U. S. had suggested he do this to gain U. N. support for Lebanon.⁹

The U. S., for its part, had ample evidence of the accuracy of the Lebanese complaint on the violation of its borders. A document titled "A List of Reports Received by the U. S. Government bearing on the UAR Intervention in Lebanon," covering the period from May 11 through June 21, 1958, lists daily incursions, monetary transfers, clandestine meetings in Damascus between the Syrian Secret Service (Deuxieme Bureau) and Lebanese opposition groups, and vehicular transfers of men and armaments. The movement of regular Syrian Army Commandos into Lebanon to support rebel actions as well as to provide recruiting and training services is documented as well.¹⁰

The United Nations conducted a superficial investigation and concluded that the "infiltration was not so heavy as President Chamoun claimed."¹¹ Apparently the U. S. was unwilling to share the information it had which validated the Lebanese claims. The U. S. told Chamoun that it was willing to act when it felt the situation warranted, but that the root cause for the current crisis was the illegality of Chamoun's second term

⁹Telegram, "Department of State to the American Embassy, Beirut," May 13, 1958, DDRS, 1696, 1988.

¹⁰ Department of State, "A LIST OF REPORTS RECEIVED BY THE US GOVERNMENT BEARING ON UAR INTERVENTION IN LEBANON," June 1958, DDRS, 216, 1988.

¹¹Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 268.

maneuvering. And the crisis did indeed pass when President Chamoun declared his intention to leave office upon the expiration of his term.¹²

C. OPERATION BLUEBAT.

American actions in the crisis initially included the redeployment of the Sixth Fleet, but advance planning for the possible use of European based U. S. Army forces, later in conjunction with Cyprus based British forces, had been underway for sometime.

As a result of General Ridgway and then General Taylor's concern over maintaining a limited war capability, the Army Staff had been working on the development of a plan for contingency operations since 1956. This was not a joint effort, however, and the development and logistics support such a plan would require, while understood, was not properly addressed as the Army was well aware that an expansion of administration strategy would not be well received. The necessity for consensus action by the JCS and the continuing budget driven force structure that Secretary of Defense Wilson strove to achieve inhibited broadcasting Army initiative. Code named SWAGGERSTICK, the Army staff plan envisioned the landing of as much as a two division force between Middle East combatants to prevent or stop

¹²Ibid., p.269.

a war.¹³ This Strategic Army Corps was to be, in General Ridgway's words, "a fast moving, hard hitting, joint force."¹⁴ Since the troops were to be based in the United States the airlift would have been significant and most likely would have necessitated a national emergency declaration to implement, an unlikely occurrence in the planning of that time.

In spite of Ridgway and Taylor's concern that the administration was neglecting the conventional or limited war aspects of its policies, planning for just such capability was ordered by the administration in mid 1957 following the April Jordanian crisis. This was a joint plan from the very beginning, involving Admiral James Holloway, Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the Army's 11th Airborne Division in Europe. A new command was formed, Specified Command Middle East, which would be activated in the event of a Middle East crisis. As planning progressed in the fall of 1957, the staff of the 11th Armored Division hosted a joint war game to work through the theater operation. Major General Gray, the Commander, would later call this the "single most important action taken" in the development of the plan for it highlighted the complexity of the

¹³H. B. Yoshpe and J. Bykofsky, Lebanon: A Test of Army Contingency Planning, (Washington: Department of the Army, 25 Nov 1958), pp. 13-15, as cited by Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), p. 7.

¹⁴Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, as told to Harold H. Martin, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 327-328, as cited in Spiller, p.8.

co-ordination as well as the extent of the sea and airlift that would be required for execution.¹⁵

The final plan, code named OPERATION BLUEBAT, was a theater operations plan, joint in nature, providing for operations in support of Lebanon or Jordan. Later directives included additional plans for operations in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These last were not considered workable because of insufficient airlift and, more critically, a lack of combat air support from the Air Force and the Navy due to the isolation and distances involved.¹⁶ The plan had two courses of action, which also made it the first combined plan since World War II. The first option included the participation of British forces and the second replaced British forces with the U. S. Marines. The British were likely informed of this option, but not until the first Lebanese crisis in May, 1958, were they actually participants in the planning.

The tasking and direction of the Administration provide clear evidence of its reliance on, and understanding of, the value of the conventional ability of its dual capable forces. The Army forces were already realigned into the pentomic structure and were deployed in Europe with their Honest John nuclear missiles as these plans evolved. The Sixth Fleet and the

¹⁵David W. Gray, The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), p.5.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 6.

Fleet Marine Force were similarly appreciated for their appropriateness in response to low level crisis as we have seen.

D. CRISIS AND RESPONSE.

The tense situation in May had not resulted in the landing of U. S. forces in Lebanon, but the Administration had not only moved the Sixth Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean but also placed the 11th Airborne and its support Task Force, 201, on alert in Germany. The alert was called on the 17th of May and the troops finally stood down with "a mass air drop on their headquarters" one week later. During this period the U. S. and British military were authorized to conduct formal meetings to finalize their plans for combined operations.¹⁵

The Americans and the British were committed to providing support to the Lebanese and the Jordanians if grave threats to their independence arose. In discussions in Washington, on June 10th and 11th, the President and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed on close consultation, the maintenance of a military posture to quickly respond and "a careful weighing by the U. S. and U. K. Governments" of both the "short range advantages" as well as the "long range consequences" of their actions.¹⁶ The maintenance of stability assured access to regional resources for the U. K. and

¹⁵. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹⁶Department of State, "Macmillan Talks, Situation in Lebanon," June 9-11, 1958, DDRS, 1573, 1988.

provided the U. S. with opportunities for economic and military assistance.

Lebanon returned to a period of uneasy calm with President Chamoun's announcement of his intention to abide by the constitution and not seek a second term. The Lebanese Army regained partial control of the countryside and order was restored in the major cities. But the Eisenhower administration remained wary and the president directed that the military remain prepared to respond.¹⁷ The lessons learned from the alert period were reviewed and with the identification of the assigned European based forces now known throughout NATO, further planning proceeded easier.

E. LEBANON LANDING.

At ten minutes past eight on the morning of July the 14th the President was briefed with the confirmation of reports coming out of the Middle East for the past several hours: The Iraqi government had been overthrown and the royal family assassinated. The administration response was an immediate review of its options, meetings with Congressional leaders, and consultation with allies. Shortly after 2pm the State Department reported the receipt of an official request from the Government of Lebanon and President Chamoun for the landing of U.S. troops within 48 hours.

¹⁷Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation" June 15th, 1958, DDRS, 1507, 1989.


Following an NSC meeting to receive the latest information the administration held the first of two meetings with Congressional leaders. The President, and the Dulles brothers, Generals Twining and Goodpaster, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles met in the Oval Office to discuss the course of action the Administration would take.¹⁸

The Sixth Fleet was directed, by the CNO, Admiral Burke, at 9:30 Washington time (WT), to move towards Lebanon and be prepared to land the Marines. The disposition of the Marines [MAP 2] would allow the Administration to respond with impressive speed. The Army component of BLUEBAT was advised of its possible movement by 1115 WT, and the CNO was advising Admiral Holloway of an imminent decision on whether to land the Marines at 1500 WT.¹⁹

The official request for U. S. assistance from the Government of Lebanon was received at 1430 WT and, it was shortly after this, that the final determination of administration action was decided upon. The U. S. would unilaterally place troops in Lebanon with a surprise landing and provide logistic support to Jordan. The president would make a statement as the landing was occurring, and the U. S. would place the issue before the U. N. Security Council. Following discussions with Prime Minister Macmillan and Prime Minister Diefenbaker of

¹⁸The White House, "Timetable of Events, July 14-19," DDRS, 627, 1985.

¹⁹Jack Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon, (Washington: Dept of the Navy, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, G-3, 1966), p. 9.



Dispositions of Marine Units 14 July 1958.


SOURCE: ROGER J. SPILLER, "NOT WAR BUT LIKE WAR": The American Intervention in Lebanon. p19.

Canada, the President had Admiral Burke inform Admiral Holloway of the decision and set the Landing for 1500(Lebanon Time) on the 15th of July.²⁰

Two Marine Battalions were landed in the next 24 hours and a third, airlifted, by Marine Corps Air, from the East Coast of the U. S., began arriving on the morning of the 18th. On the 19th lead elements of the 24th Airborne began arriving at Beirut Airport,[MAP 3] staging out of Adana Turkey. They were followed by the sea lift of heavy armored forces which arrived in the port of Beirut in early August. Although there were minor holdups in the deployment, the United States placed over 15,000 troops on the ground, in and about Beirut, in ten days. The Marines relied on the Sixth Fleet for their logistical support and the Air Force supported the Army out of its airhead in Turkey.

The response of the Lebanese Army to the landing of U. S. forces had been a major concern in the planning of the landing. The Marines and the Lebanese were literally barrel to barrel before a meeting between the Lebanese Commander, General Chehab, the U. S. Commanders, Admiral Holloway and General Wade, and the U. S. Ambassador, Robert McClintock, was hastily arranged in a small school house on a road between the airport and the city. The leaders succeeded in establishing a satisfactory method of patrolling the city as well as providing liaison officers

²⁰Ibid., p. 10.



Deployment of Army Task Force 201 on 16 July 1958 and after.

SOURCE: ROGER J. SPILLER, "NOT WAR BUT LIKE WAR": The American Intervention in Lebanon, p.30.

between the forces. No further incidents occurred between them and the U. S. forces were warmly received by the inhabitants of Beirut.²¹

The President made a radio and television announcement of the landing on the evening of July the 15th. In it he stressed that U. S. forces were landed to protect American lives and property and "by their presence there encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."²² No mention was made of the Eisenhower Doctrine or the external threats to the government of Lebanon because this was not a containment issue but rather a display of American support, military ability, values and commitment to stability.

Washington also sent Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to function as political advisor to the joint commander. Murphy quickly proved his value. Conducting meetings with all of the Lebanese factions, he and Admiral Holloway also realized that the basic issues in Lebanon had to do more with personalities than with the international threat or a communist insurrection.²³ Murphy was successful in bringing the Lebanese together for the purposes of choosing a new President. On the 31st of July General Chehab was elected to replace President Chamoun in September and the Americans immediately announced

²¹Ibid., p. 21-28.

²²Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 274.

²³Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964) p.398 and 404. As cited in Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon, p. 33.

that they would begin to withdraw as soon as the government of Lebanon so requested.

Response to the administration's action in Lebanon was predictable. The militant Arab states condemned it and threatened U. S. interests, strong support was voiced by the Turks and the Jordanians (whom the British were assisting), and the new regime in Iraq stated its desire to maintain friendly relations with the U. S. and the U. K.. The Soviets blustered and postured but took no overt action. Their statements and communications elicited a strong letter from Eisenhower in response. In it the president clearly signaled his perception of the dangers of inaction as "one small nation after another were to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the Soviet Union." He justified action as being in "accord with the accepted principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and ... the appeal made by President Chamoun with full approval of the Cabinet." ²⁴

The success of the intervention can be attributed to different things: advance planning; the overwhelming size of the force committed; the speed with which the administration was able to decide to employ its forces, and the speed with which that force was placed on scene; the involvement and support of another Western power; the low level threat to U. S. forces; the inherent good will and sense of awe which the U. S. was still

²⁴Department of State, "President Eisenhower's Reply to Chairman Khrushchev", July 23, 1958, DORS, 2872, 1988.

able to evoke; and the success of the Deputy Secretary in divorcing U. S. action from support of the political aspirations of President Chamoun.

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Chapter IV

Conclusion.

The involvement in Lebanon would be the only time that the Eisenhower administration would decide to use such a large display of force to support political goals. The fundamental tenant of the Eisenhower Doctrine to protect friendly governments from communist aggression was not publicly invoked and never would be by the administration.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was an attempt to come to terms with the combination of Pan Arabism, anti-colonialism, and the ambition of Nasser and his ability to use the Soviet Union as a counter balance to the West in the Middle East. The administration was unable to approach Nasser or to find a more realistic way of treating him. The efforts by some historians to portray Eisenhower as a Eurocentric president who merely played the Middle East for its impact on his European allies ignores the strong moral sense Eisenhower had in seeking solutions. This

need for doing the right thing is evident in his insistence on providing a proper legal foundation for his actions and his perception of the world order. This may indeed be part of the affiliation between Eisenhower and the erstwhile lawyer John Foster Dulles. The threat of communism was not only a military threat but also a threat to subjugate legitimate national aspirations in the post colonial world.

The evolution of the administration in its foreign policy and strategic execution can be traced through the history of its New Look and its the budgetary efforts to provide quality forces while preserving the economic integrity of the United States. As with any program in a changing environment the focus changed as the circumstances changed. The requirement for the various service chiefs to meet the tasking of budget based force structures necessitated addressing force utilization. The result was an escalation of the conventional or limited war capability to a major agenda item in determining long range U. S. foreign policy. Disagreement in the budget driven planning of the first defense budgets did not result in the complete revamping of the chosen military and civilian leadership. The confidence Eisenhower had in his ability to judge character and talent enabled him to ask for concurrence and problem solving as a function of agenda making. His organization of the primary foreign policy decision making body, the NSC, maintained control of the decision process while encouraging participation and information sharing at lower levels.

The Eisenhower administration undertook distinct attempts to handle the emerging assertiveness of the Middle East: support for the reduction of colonial power, the use of pacts and alliances to provide mutual regional support, the encouragement of alternatives to the radical nationalism of the Pan Arabists, and a firm public commitment of military and economic support to guarantee freedom of action to the emerging states. In Lebanon the administration found the opportunity to display the American commitment to Arab self determination and rightful self sovereignty that had not been visible in the post World War I era. From this as well as its efforts on behalf of Egypt in the Suez Crisis can be seen the fundamental concern for stability, peace and moral behavior that marked the Eisenhower Administration.


The communist threat was understood but did not prevent the Administration from reacting decisively to meet other challenges. The need for strong strategic forces did not remove the need for capable conventional forces or the will to use them. Strategies, such as the New Look, can expand over time to increase options and enhance decision making.

The result of this research has been to confirm the validity of the proper application of force in proportional response to instability and potential aggression. Future force structure decisions must include the understanding and necessity of speed of response. Regression to unbalanced force structures as originally attempted by the budgeteers of the early Eisen-

hower administration must be countered by the experience of history.

The Pan Arab legacy of Nasser is a fundamental part of the Middle East political landscape but not the only one. Nations, even the artificial ones of this region, have interests and political objectives of their own. Arab nationalism is not a threat to the United States unless it perverts the regional balance and undermines the stability the fragile nations of the region require to exist. As a superpower the United States can provide the presence to ensure stability. The ability of the United States to project force in this area in support of its allies and its own national interests remains a necessity.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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